Article 130-133 Property Relations between Husband and Wife

Reporters:

Keithleen Joyce Jacob 

Cleotilde Ilagan 

FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

TITLE IV: Property Relations between Husband and Wife

Chapter 3. Conjugal Partnership of Gains

Section 7. Liquidation of the Conjugal Partnership Assets and Liabilities

Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.

            If no judicial proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six-month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void.

           Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage. (n)

  ü  Termination by death:

Ø  Conjugal Partnership of Gains shall be inventoried, administered and liquidated and the debts shall be paid.

Ø  Settlement of the estate of the deceased may be intestate or testate.

Ø  Heirs of legal age or minors duly represented by their judicial or legal representatives may, without securing letters of administrator from the court, divide the estate among themselves.

Article 131. Whenever the liquidation of conjugal partnership properties of two or more marriages contracted by the same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits and income of each partnership shall be determined upon such proof as may be considered according to the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which partnership the existing properties belong, the same shall be divided between the different partnerships in proportion to the capital and duration of each. (189a)

  ü  Simultaneous liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties of each of the two marriages contracted prior to August 3, 1988

  ü  For instance, the inventoried assets of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains are Php 150,000.00. If the 1^st marriage lasted for 2 years, it will get 2/5 of the Php 150,000.00. If the 2^nd marriage lasted for 3 years, it will get 3/5 of the Php 150,000.00.

Article 132. The Rules of Court on the administration of estates of deceased persons shall be observed in the appraisal and sale of property of the conjugal partnership, and other matters which are not expressly determined in this Chapter. (187a)

ü  The administration of estates of deceased persons shall be observed in the appraisal and sale of property of the conjugal partnership guided by the rules of court.

Article 133. From the common mass of property, support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the inventoried property until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them. (188a)

  ü  Only the surviving spouse and the children are entitled to get the allowances for support

  ü  Allowances for support to the children and the spouse of the deceased pending liquidation of the estate are subject to collation and deductible from their share of the inheritance insofar as they exceed what they are entitled to as fruits or income 

References:

Judge Albano, Ed Vincent S. (2017). Family Code of the Philippines

CASE DIGEST: G.R. No. 200274, April 20, 2016

MELECIO DOMINGO, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES GENARO MOLINA AND ELENA B. MOLINA, SUBSTITUTED BY ESTER MOLINA, Respondents.

PONENTE: Justice BRION

FACTS:

  

  ü  In June 1951, Sps. Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property at Camiling,  

         Tarlac, consisting of one-half undivided portion over 18,164 sq. m., parcel of land.

  ü  During his lifetime Anastacio has been borrowing money from the respondent  

         Sps. Genaro and Elena Molina.  

  ü  Ten years after the death of Flora, Anastacio sold his interest over the property to 

         the Sps. Molina to answer for his debts.  

  ü  The sale was registered and the entire one-half undivided portion was transferred 

          to the Sps. Molina.

  ü  Petitioner Melecio, one of the children of Anastacio learned about the transfer so      he filed a complaint for Annulment of Title and for Recovery of Ownership    

         against respondents Sps. Molina.  

  ü  Melecio claims that Anastacio gave the subject property to the Sps. Molina to 

         serve as collateral for the money that his father borrowed.  

  ü  He further alleged that his father Anastacio could not have validly sold the 

         interest over the property without Flora’s consent, as the latter died at the time 

         the sale was made.

  ü  On the other hand, Sps. Molina asserted that Anastacio surrendered the title of 

         the subject property to answer for his debts and told Sps. Molina that they own 

         already half of the land.  

  ü  The Sps. Molina have been in possession of the subject property before the title 

          was registered under their names and have religiously paid the property’s real 

           estate taxes.

  ü  RTC dismissed the case because Melecio failed to establish that Anastacio did  

         not sell the property to the Sps. Molina.   RTC ruled further that Anastascio could 

        dispose of conjugal property without Flora’s consent since the sale was necessary 

        to answer for conjugal liabilities.  

  ü  Melecio filed an MR but denied by the RTC.  So he assailed the case before the 

         CA.

  ü  CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.  It gave credence to the OCT annotation of 

          the disputed property sale.  It further held that Flora’s death is immaterial 

          because Anastacio only solve his rights, excluding that of Flora’sinterest.  

  ü  CA explained that “there is no prohibition against the sale by the widower of real 

          property formerly belonging to a conjugal partnership of gains”.  Melecio filed 

          MR but the same was denied.

ISSUE: 

     Whether or not the sale of a conjugal property to the Sps. Molina without Floras consent is valid?

HELD: 

      Yes. The sale of the conjugal property to the Sps. Molina is valid even without Floras consent.  The SC held that the Sps. Anastacio and Flora got married before the Family Code took effect on Aug. 3, 1988 so their property relation is conjugal partnership.   Anastacio and Flora’s conjugal partnership was dissolved upon Floras death pursuant to Article 126 (1) of the Family Code.

Art. 130 of the Family Code which provides that any disposition or encumbrances involving the conjugal property without prior liquidation of the partnership shall be void, this rule does not apply since the provision of the Family Code shall be “without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

The SC cited Taningco vs. Register of Deeds of Laguna wherein the court held that the properties of a dissolved conjugal partnership fall under the regime of co-ownership among the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased.  In the case at bar, an implied co-ownership among Flora’s heirs governed the conjugal properties pending liquidation and partition.  Anastacio, owns one-half of the original conjugal partnership properties as his share, but this is an undivided interest.

Thus, under Article 493 of the Civil Code on co-ownership Anastacio, as co-owner, cannot claim title to any specific portion of the conjugal properties without an actual partition being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. But, Anastacio had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest in the subject property.

Articles 175 to 176 FAMILY CODE (Paternity and Filiation)

reporters:
Henry Herrera
Cleotilde Ilagan
Keithleen Joyce Jacob
Francis Mata

FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

TITLE VI: PATERNITY AND FILIATION

Chapter 3. Illegitimate Children

Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (289a)

Filiation of illegitimate children may establish as follows:

Art. 172

ü  Record of birth appearing in the civil register or final judgment; or

ü  An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned;

Ø  In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by;

§  The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

§  Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Art. 173

ü  Claim for legitimacy 

Ø  May be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during his minority or in state of insanity. (5 years to institute action)

Art. 172 paragraph 2

ü  (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned;

ü  Article 172 paragraph 2 is an exception because if the putative parent is already dead, he can no longer talk or defend his/herself.

Illustration:   

§  A and B have an illegitimate child C born on 1988.

§  A died in 2010. C cannot go to Court anymore to establish filiation because of the death of A.

§  But if A died when C is still a minor, he has the right to go to court to establish filiation.

Marquino vs. IAC

GR No. 72078, June 27, 1994

52 SCAD 425

Eustiquio Marquino and Maria Terenal-Marquino (wife) survived by Luz Marquino, Ana Marquino and Eva Marquino “legitimate children” (Petitioners)

Bibiana Romano-Pagadora survived by Pedro, Emy, June, Edgar, May, Mago, Arden and Mars Pagadora (Respondents)

FACTS:

Respondent Bibiana filed action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation, Annulment of Partition, Support and Damages against Eutiquio.  Bibiana was born on December 1926 allegedly of Eutiquio and in that time was single.  It was alleged that the Marquino family personally knew her since she was hired as domestic helper in their household at Dumaguete.  She likewise received financial assistance from them hence, she enjoyed continuous possession of the status of an acknowledged natural child by direct and unequivocal acts of the father and his family.  The Marquinos denied all these.  Respondent was not able to finish presenting her evidence since she died on March 1979 but the sue for compulsory recognition was done while Eustiquio was still alive.  Her heirs were ordered to substitute her as parties-plaintiffs. 

Petitioners, legitimate children of Eutiquio, assailed decision of respondent court in holding that the heirs of Bibiana, allegedly a natural child of Eutiquio, can continue the action already filed by her to compel recognition and the death of the putative parent will not extinguish such action and can be continued by the heirs substituting the said deceased parent.

ISSUES:

1.  Whether or not the right of action for acknowledgment as a natural child be transmitted to the heirs and 

2.  Whether or not Article 173 can be given retroactive effect.

HELD:

SC ruled that right of action for the acknowledgment as a natural child can never be transmitted because the law does not make any mention of it in any case, not even as an exception.  The right is purely a personal one to the natural child.  The death of putative father in an action for recognition of a natural child can not be continued by the heirs of the former since the party in the best position to oppose the same is the putative parent himself. 

Such provision of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect so as to apply in the case at bar since it will prejudice the vested rights of petitioners transmitted to them at the time of death of their father.

IAC decision was reversed and set aside.  The petition against Marquino’s were dismissed.

Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. (287a)

Legitimate Children	Illegitimate Children
As to Use of Surname
Right to bear father’s surname	Generally required to use the mother’s surname Exception: If child’s filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father (R.A. No. 9255, Sec. 1).
As to Parental Authority
Joint authority of parents	Sole parental authority of mother
As to Support
Entitled to receive support from any of his or her direct ascendants and descendants in accordance with the priority set by law in Art. 195 and 199 of Family Code (Sta. Maria supra at 686).	Entitled to receive support only up to his or her grandparents or grandchildren as provided for in Art. 195, pars. 2 and 3 (Sta. Maria, supra at p.686).
As to Successional Right
Entitled to inheritance	Entitled to ½ of legitimate child’s inheritance

Definition of Terms:

Illegitimate – Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage. (Art. 165)

Legitimate – Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. (Art. 164)

Paternity and Maternity – is the civil status of a father / mother with regard to the child.

Filiation – Is the civil status of a child with regard to his parents. Nature or by adoption (Art. 163)

 Surname of illegitimate child

Article 176 and RA 9255

The provision of Article 176 of the Family Code states that:

·         illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother

·         shall be under the parental authority of their mother

·         shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.

However, it has been amended by RA 9255, “An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father” which took effect on February 4, 2004.  The law now provides that “illegitimate children may use the surname of their father when:

           ·         if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the 

                record of birth appearing in the civil registrar;

           ·         the admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made

                by the father.

If the putative(supposed) father is not sure  whether or not he is really the father of the illegitimate child or children, the law provides that the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime and the legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitimate child.

Note that it is not the father or the mother who is granted by the law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children because the law uses the word “may”.  Therefore, the illegitimate children has the right to decide whether or not they use the surname of the father.

It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting children are to be measured is their best interest (Grande vs. Antonio, GR 206248, February 18, 2014, Ponente: Associate Justice Presbitero Velasco, Jr.).

Case Digest : 

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE, respondent. 514 SCRA 76, G.R. No. 157043 February 2, 2007

FACTS

        Respondent, Trinidad R. A. Capote (ad litem) filed a petition for change of name of her ward from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.  Giovanni N. Gallamoso is the illegitimate natural child  of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado Gallamoso who was born on July 9, 1982 before the Family Code took effect.  His mother used the surname of the natural father despite the absence of marriage.  From the time he was born up to the present, his father failed to take the responsibilities to him on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns.  Giovanni as a grown up, now fully aware of how he stands with his father and he desires to have his surname change to that of his mother's surname.  Giovanni's mother is intending to petition him to join her in the US and his continued use of the surname Gallamaso may complicate his status as natural child.

      The trial court granted the petition while the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an appeal with a contention that the trial court erred in granting the petition in a summary proceeding.   CA affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE

     Whether or not the petition for change of surname be granted.

HELD

     The Supreme Court declared through its ponente, then Justice Corona that respondent's evidence sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mother’s intended petition to have him join her in the United States. The Court further held that they will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.  

Chapter 3 Effect of Parental Authority Upon the Persons of the Children - ARTICLES 220 TO 224

Reporters:

Henry Herrera

Cleotilde Ilagan

The FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Title IX – PARENTAL AUTHORITY

Chapter 3 – Effect of Parental Authority upon the Persons of the Children

Article 220

The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with the respect to their unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:

1. To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
2. To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding;
3. To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;
4. To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at all times;
5. To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
6. To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
7. To demand from them respect and obedience;
8. To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and
9. To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians. (316a)

Unemancipated child refers to a minor who is not yet free from the custody of parental control due to being under the age of majority.

From the enumeration of Art. 220, the parents or whosoever has the custody of the child are supposed to promote the social, mental and physical development of the child.

It is provided under Art. 220 (7) and (8), children shall at all times, respect their parents and they are obliged to obey them.  Parents may also impose discipline on them as may be required by the circumstances. 

Article 221

Parents and those who are exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts of omissions of their unemacipated child living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.

LIABILITY OF A MOTHER OR FATHER and

THOSE EXERCISING PARENTAL AUTHORITY

OVER A CHILD

Illustration:

     X, a minor child living in Manila while his parents are in the province, X commits an act or omission causing damage to another, the parents are not liable.

Under Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines, parents and those who are exercising parental authority over the unemancipated child are jointly and solidary liable for the acts or omissions of their minor for their failure to supervise them in order to prevent them from causing damage to other person.

It was insisted under the provision of Article 221 of the Family Code the requisite that the child, doer of the tortuous act, shall have been in the actual custody of the parents and guardians before the latter will be held liable for the damages.

Tort – an act or omission that gives rise to injury or harm to another and amounts to a civil wrong for which courts imposes liability.

Ex.  If a minor child in the company of his parents, commits a tortuous act:
      w the parents are not liable together
      w his father should be sued alone
      w in the absence of the father or in his
          incapacity, the mother can be made
          liable.

When an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortuous acts, the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control.

Liability of other persons exercising parental authority.

Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child under their supervision, instructions of custody:

1) the school, its administration and teachers;
2) the individual entity or institution engaged in child care.

This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.

        Ex. Field trips and other affairs of pupils and students  outside the school premises whether authorized by its school or teachers. (St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos et. al)

CASE DIGEST

G.R. NO. 143363, February 6,2002

ST. MARY’S ACADEMY, petitioner vs.

WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL SR., and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA, respondents

PONENTE:  Justice Pardo

FACTS:

Defendant-Appellant, St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment campaign drive for the school year 1995-1996.  The campaign drive conducted visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying.  Sherwin Carpitanos, as a student of St. Mary’s Academy, participated in the campaign.  On the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Dapitan City.  The jeep was allegedly driven by James Daniel II, 15 years old and student of the same school.  The latter allegedly drove the jeep in the reckless manner and resulted the jeep to capsize. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained.

           

            RTC held that St. Mary’s Academy principally liable for the death of Sherwin as it had special parental authority over the minor at the time of the incident.  James Daniel, the minor driver who was under special parental authority of the school was ABSOLVED from paying damages.  The liability of the parents of James  were only subsidiary. Owner of the jeep, Vivencio Villanueva is also ABSOLVED.

            CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:    Whether or not the appellant school, St. Mary’s Academy as an institution exercising parental authority over the child, Sherwin Carpitanos is liable for damages for the latter’s death.

HELD: 

The Supreme Court held that it is not the school but the registered owner of the jeep, Vivencio Villanueva is liable for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. 

Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the school shall have special parental authority over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.  This special authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school. 

Furthermore, SC said that under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor under their supervision, instruction, or custody.  However, considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which appellant, St. Mary’s Academy had no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, appellant may not be held liable for the death resulting from the accident.

            The Supreme Court reverses and set aside the ruling of the CA and that of the trial court.  The Court remands the case to the trial court for determination of the liability of defendants, excluding appellant, St. Mary’s Academy.

Article 222
            The courts may appoint a guardian of the child’s property, or a guardian ad litem when the best interests of the child so require.(317)

            ad litem – latin “for the suit”
            guardian ad litem – guardian for the suit

Illustration :
            Assume that child x has properties received from his mother w. His father h is a drug defendant and a gambler and doesn’t have any care for x. Assuming that h would abuse his powers as guardian over the properties of x.
            The court may appoint a guardian of the child’s property or a guardian ad litem.
            “The best interest of the child is always of paramount importance.”
            X may sue his father h. He needs a guardian ad litem.

Article 223

            The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individual entity or institution exercising parental authority, may petition the proper court of the place where the child resides, for an order providing for disciplinary measures over the child.

The child shall be entitled to the assistance of counsels, either of his choice or appointed by the court, and a summary hearing shall be conducted wherein the petitioner and the child shall be heard.
            However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or when the circumstances so warrant, the court may also order the deprivation or suspension of parental authority or adopt such other measure as it may deem just and proper.(318a)

As an incident to the duty of parents to uphold the best interest of the child, the parents can impose certain form of discipline upon him but the same must be reasonable.

Parents and those persons exercising authority over a minor may go to court and apply for providing for disciplinary measures over the child.  But if the court finds that parents or the one who has custody of the child to be at fault, the court may suspend or deprive them of their parental authority.

           

Article 224

If proven that the child is at fault, the child will be committed for not more than thirty (30) days in entities or institutions engaged in child care or children’s home accredited by the government.

The parent or guardian shall not interfere with the care of the child whenever committed to the said institution but shall provide for his support.

Upon proper petition or at its own instance, the court may terminate the commitment of the child whenever just and proper.
           

References:

Judge Albano, Ed Vincent S. (2017). Family Code of the Philippines